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INTRODUCTION

In federal courts, most appeals from the district courts are
decided by three-judge panels, which are randomly drawn from the
entire membership of the circuit.1 However, through a procedure
called “en banc,” a majority of the judges on that circuit may
determine that a panel’s decision should be reconsidered by the full
court.2 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure suggest that the en
banc procedure should be reserved for cases of exceptional
importance.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, deeming very few cases worthy of en banc rehearing, hears
the fewest cases en banc of any circuit by a substantial margin.4 The
original justification for this policy, the preservation of judicial
resources, has been undermined by the frequent published opinions
dissenting from—and concurring with5—the denial of rehearing en
banc. Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Alex Kozinski has coined the
terms “dissental” and “concurral” to refer to such opinions.6 These
opinions are often used as a signaling device intended to encourage
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, prompting one commentator to
describe Kozinski’s own “dissentals” as the “Bat Signal to the
Supreme Court.”7
1

See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006) (“Cases and controversies shall be heard and
determined by a court or panel of not more than three judges . . . .”).
2
FED. R. APP. P. 35. An en banc hearing can also be called in lieu of a threejudge panel, but this is extremely rare. See, e.g., Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Penaranda, 375
F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2004) (en banc).
3
See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (“An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored.”).
4
See discussion infra Part I.A.
5
This is also known as a “counter-dissenting” opinion. See, e.g., Int’l Bus.
Machs. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 303–05 (1973) (Timbers, J.,
dissenting).
6
John Roemer, Chief Judge Coins New Words for Failed Enbanc Calls,
DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 8, 2011, at 1; see also Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I
Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 601 (2012),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/10/kozinski&burnham.html; David Lat,
Grammer Pole of the Weak: ‘I Respectfully Dissental,’ ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 8,
2011, 3:34 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/09/grammer-pole-of-the-weak-irespectfully-dissental (describing different terms for opinions regarding the denial
of rehearing en banc).
7
Kashmir Hill, Judge Kozinski Doesn’t Track with the Ninth Circuit on GPS
and the Fourth Amendment, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:00 PM),
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The increasing prevalence—or in the case of the Second
Circuit, resurgence—of these opinions is an inefficient use of judicial
resources. In every year since 2004, the Second Circuit has produced
at least one opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc,
including eight since 2010.8 As the number of judges in active
service on the Second Circuit has increased,9 the length and
contentiousness of these opinions have also risen. Modifying the
standards for en banc review would divert the judicial energy that is
being expended on these opinions towards the generation of
precedential opinions, while reducing the number of dissents and
concurrences regarding the denial of rehearing en banc.
Part I of this Note is an empirical survey of the history of the
en banc practice in the Second Circuit.10 First is an explanation of the
en banc process and an examination of the hearings en banc that did
take place and their outcomes in the Supreme Court. Second is a
discussion of the mini en banc, which is the practice of circulating
opinions that serves as an abbreviated substitute for full en banc
hearings. Third is an examination of the myriad opinions that have
been inspired by the denials of rehearing en banc, with special
attention to the circumstances surrounding the individual opinions
and the tendencies of individual judges, past and present.
Part II of this Note analyzes the underlying decision-making
processes judges employ when deciding whether to author opinions
related to the denial of rehearing en banc.11 It begins by discussing
the various elements of the judicial economy function focusing
specifically on court of appeals judges. Next is an explanation of the
various audiences for judicial opinions. Third is an examination of
the dissent in the context of the judicial economy function. This Part
concludes with an analysis of the signaling function and the “case or
controversy” constitutionality concern that it raises.
Part III of this Note argues that the opinions related to denial
of rehearing en banc are counterproductive because of their limited
value and considerable cost in terms of time. Several methods that
may preserve the benefits of a limited en banc tradition without
needlessly hindering the prerogatives of the dissenting judges are
explored.12 First is a proposal to shift to a system that approximates
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/08/judge-kozinski-doesnt-track-with-the-ninthcircuit-on-gps-and-the-fourth-amendmentcalls-his-fellow-judges-cultural-elitistswhen-it-comes-to-privacy.
8
See infra Table 2.
9
See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
10
See infra Part I.
11
See infra Part II.
12
See infra Part III.
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the Supreme Court’s “Rule of Four,” requiring less than a majority of
judges to institute an en banc rehearing. The second proposal is a
system where a precedential en banc rehearing could be conducted
based on the original briefs, limiting the time and expense required to
obtain an opinion of the full court. This Part concludes with a
proposal providing that if the en banc vote is unsuccessful, any
decision reaching the underlying merits should be barred from
publication in the Federal Reporter, with publication of only the vote
tally.
I.

EN BANC PRACTICE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT

A.
Hearings En Banc
En banc rehearings are governed by Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and are typically reserved for cases of
exceptional importance.13 An en banc hearing in federal courts of
appeals can be initiated by a petition by one of the parties or by the
judges nostra sponte, which means the court can initiate the
procedure without the request of a litigant.14 However, even if a
party petitions, no vote is taken unless a judge calls for it.15 The
petition is merely a suggestion; the ultimate authority to determine
which cases merit en banc rehearing is vested with the court of
appeals.16 Whether a party petitioned for rehearing or not, when en
banc is granted, the panel opinion is vacated and the en banc opinion
nearly always reaches a contrary conclusion.17 Even when the vote is
unsuccessful, it can prompt the panel to incorporate the concerns of
13

See FED R. APP. P. 35.
See id. The term nostra sponte is frequently used by the Second Circuit in
situations where a single judge would be ruling sua sponte. See, e.g., United States
v. Stewart, 597 F.3d 2010 (2d Cir. 2010) (Pooler, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“The nostra sponte en banc poll, predicated on the rationale set
forth in the dissent, did not succeed.”); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 155 (2d
Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur Court, nostra sponte, ordered an en banc consideration”).
15
FED R. APP. P. 35(f).
16
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting
Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953)) (“§ 46(c)
is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the Court of Appeals. It is a grant of
power. It vests in the court the power to order hearings en banc. It goes no
further.”).
17
Because the opinion is vacated and replaced, rather than affirmed or
reversed, the level of modification varies greatly and is not easily tracked.
However, an empirical comparison of the en banc opinions listed in Table 1 and
the corresponding panel opinions suggests that a contrary conclusion is reached in
the majority of en banc opinions.
14
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the judge seeking rehearing by amending the original panel
opinion.18
Any statistical study of the Second Circuit’s en banc practice
should begin with a caveat: the official annual reports have
historically failed to capture the accurate number of en banc
hearings.19 The data regarding petitions and the judge-initiated polls
for rehearing en banc are sparse, and the cases use conflicting
terminology.20 Because the en banc rehearing automatically vacates
the panel opinion, comparing outcomes is not as simple as a reversal
or affirmance. Nevertheless, thanks to a series of articles published
by former Second Circuit Chief Judge Jon O. Newman, much of the
behind the scenes machinations involved in the decision-making
related to rehearings en banc in the Second Circuit has been
elucidated.21 In addition, many of the opinions relating to the denial
of rehearing en banc include individual judges’ opinions on the
advantages and disadvantages of the Second Circuit’s policy to hear
few en banc cases.22
In the early twentieth century, the increase in judgeships
authorized for each circuit court led to the development of a variant
of stare decisis known as the “law of the circuit” doctrine, which
bound panels within a circuit to follow legal precedents announced
by other panels in that circuit.23 It also led to en banc rehearings, the
18

See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit Review—1982–1983 Term:
Foreword: In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50
BROOK. L. REV. 365, 380 (1984) [hereinafter Newman I] (“A noteworthy aspect of
the unsuccessful in banc polls is that on occasion the request for a poll and the
indication of some support for an in banc rehearing has been followed by
modification of the panel opinion.”).
19
See FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMMITTEE, EN
BANC PRACTICES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT, TIME FOR A CHANGE? 2 (2011) (“The
[Federal Court Management] statistics cannot be viewed as totally authoritative,
because, at least for the Second Circuit, they do not accurately capture the number
of cases in which en banc review occurs.”), available at
http://www.federalbarcouncil.org/vg/custom/uploads/pdfs/En_Banc_Report.pdf.
20
Id. at 1 n.1 (“The Second Circuit at times uses the term ‘in banc,’ which
appeared in earlier versions of FED. R. APP. P. 35. The rule currently uses the term
‘en banc’, and so we use that spelling other than in quoted excerpts from other
written work.”). This Note also adopts the current Rule’s nomenclature, except
within quotations.
21
See Newman I, supra note 188; Jon O. Newman, In Banc Practice in the
Second Circuit 1984–1988, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 355 (1989) [hereinafter Newman
II]; Jon O. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit 1989–1993, 60
BROOK. L. REV. 491 (1994) [hereinafter Newman III].
22
See infra Part I.C.
23
See United States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1176 (2d Cir. 1980) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting from denial of en banc) (describing “the commonly
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first of which was heard by the Third Circuit in 1940.24 By contrast,
the Second Circuit adhered to a policy of never sitting en banc25 until
1956, when the policy was abandoned.26 Within seven years, the
Second Circuit had heard thirty cases en banc,27 prompting Chief
Judge Lumbard to express alarm at the frequency of en banc
hearings, reflecting a desire to strictly limit the amount of cases
heard en banc.28 During this period of frequent en banc hearings,
Congress increased the authorized number of active judgeships from
six to nine in 1961—this in turn increased the likelihood that a
majority of circuit judges would disagree with a three-judge panel’s
conclusion.29 By the mid-1970s, the Second Circuit had abandoned
accepted doctrine that one Court of Appeals panel cannot overrule the decision of a
prior panel but that such disregard of stare decisis requires action by an en banc
court”). See generally Martha Dragich, Uniformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the
Circuit Doctrine, 56 LOY. L. REV. 535 (2010).
24
FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 9; see Comm’r v. Textile Mills
Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), aff’d, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (The
court has the “power to provide for sessions of the court en banc.”). In affirming,
the Supreme Court paved the way for en banc hearings in every circuit. 314 U.S. at
335 (“Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit
courts of appeal will be promoted. Those considerations are especially important in
view of the fact that in our federal judicial system these courts are the courts of last
resort in the run of ordinary cases. Such considerations are, of course, not for us to
weigh in case Congress has devised a system where the judges of a court are
prohibited from sitting en banc. But where, as here, the case on the statute is not
foreclosed, they aid in tipping the scales in favor of the more practicable
interpretation.”). The Court later clarified its views. See W. Pac. R. Corp. v. W.
Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
25
Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Sys., 194 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1951)
(“[T]he practice of this circuit never to sit in banc.”). However, in 1951, there were
only five active judges in the Second Circuit, so the panel majority would consist
of two-fifths of the judges unless a judge on senior status or sitting by designation
was part of the panel majority. See Newman I, supra note 18, at 371.
26
In re Lake Tankers Corp., 235 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1956) (en banc), aff’d sub
nom., Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147 (1957).
27
See Walters v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 895–96 (2d
Cir. 1963) (collecting cases). Judge Newman has stated that the Second Circuit sat
en banc “rarely” after Lake Tankers. However, the rate of more than four cases a
year between 1956 and 1963 is frequent when compared with the rarity of Second
Circuit en banc rehearings since 1970. Compare Newman I, supra note 18, at 371
(“Since [1956], in banc hearings have occurred rarely, though, on occasion,
memorably.”), with Walters, 312 F.2d at 895–96 (listing thirty cases over seven
years).
28
Walters, 312 F.2d at 893–94.
29
Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, 75 Stat. 80 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 44(a) to allow nine circuit judges in the Second Circuit). For information
regarding the expansion of the Second Circuit over time, see History of the Federal
Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
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its temporary increase in en banc rehearings, and has consistently
heard very few cases ever since.30
In order to harmonize the use of en banc across circuits, Rule 35
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure was introduced in 1967
to standardize the use of en banc.31 However, despite this attempt at
standardization, the circuits have continued to hear cases en banc
with frequencies that vary considerably; and the Second Circuit has
consistently heard the fewest cases en banc relative to total caseload,
as well as in absolute terms.32
The current statute requires a majority of non-disqualified
judges in active service to initiate an en banc hearing.33 If the vote is
successful, the en banc court comprises all circuit judges in active
service and any judge on senior status who participated in the
original panel or who took senior status after the en banc hearing but
before the decision.34 However, this provision regulating the en banc
court’s composure has been a source of controversy over the years.
Prior to an amendment in 2005, recusals and vacancies on the court
made it possible for an en banc rehearing to be denied despite the
support of a majority of voting judges favoring rehearing.35 When
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_coa_circuit_02.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2013).
30
See infra Table 1; see also FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL supra note 19, at 15.
31
See FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 9 (“In view of the resulting
uncertainty and inconsistency among the courts of appeals with regard to en banc
review, Congress standardized the practice through the ratification of Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 35 in 1967.”).
32
See id. at 5–6 (showing the disparity in the number of en banc hearings
conducted by each circuit between 2000–2010); see also Michael Ashley Stein,
Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc
Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 818 tbl.2 (1993) (pointing out large
differences between en banc rehearing rates between 1982–1991, including the
Second Circuit’s number of en banc decisions at 0.9 per year compared to an
average across all courts of appeal of 7.5).
33
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006) (“[A] hearing or rehearing before the court in banc
[may be] ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in
regular active service.”). Senior status judges may not participate in this vote, even
if they were on the original panel. See Moody v. Albemarle City Bd. of Educ. 417
U.S. 622, 627 (1974).
34
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (“A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in
regular active service . . . except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be
eligible (1) to participate . . . as a member of an in banc court reviewing a decision
of a panel of which such judge was a member, or (2) to continue to participate in
the decision of a case or controversy that was heard or reheard by the court in banc
at a time when such judge was in regular active service.”).
35
See Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc denied
with four judges in favor of rehearing and three opposed); Boyd v. Lefrak Org.,
517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
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the number of participating judges is reduced because of recusals and
vacancies, or increased by the presence of a senior judge from the
original panel, a minority of authorized active judges may determine
the outcome in an en banc hearing.36 However, because a majority of
active judges are required to initiate the en banc, judges who agree
with the panel majority on the merits of the case have a strategic
incentive to reject an en banc rehearing in spite of a belief that the
case otherwise meets the standards for rehearing the case en banc.37
In other words, because senior judges—who under certain
circumstances are eligible to participate in an en banc rehearing—
can never vote in the en banc poll, active judges who wish to
preserve the holding of the panel opinion may need to use the en
banc poll to express their position on the merits, even though the
purpose of an en banc poll is simply to determine whether an en banc
hearing is warranted.38
Various justifications for drastically limiting the number of
cases reheard have been advanced, including discretion and

36

See Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 303–04 (2d Cir.
1973) (Timbers, J., dissenting) (“Today’s en banc majority decision results in a
turnabout of the 2-1 panel decision . . . . Judge Mulligan’s panel dissenting
opinion, joined now by Judges Hays, Feinberg and Oakes, becomes the en banc
majority opinion by a 4-2 vote. Judge Moore’s panel majority opinion, concurred
in by Judge Timbers, becomes now the en banc dissenting opinion. Thus the law of
the Circuit on the substantial issues of unusual importance here involved is being
determined by four active judges on a Court for which Congress has provided a
nine-judge complement.”). The 2005 Amendment to Rule 35 did not eliminate the
possibility of this outcome.
37
In International Business Machines, three active judges were recused and
the court had one vacancy. Id. at 303. The case was decided by the five nonrecused active judges and Senior Judge Moore, who was eligible to participate
since he had served on the original panel. The only judges eligible to vote in the en
banc poll were the five non-recused active judges; all five votes were required to
reach a majority of authorized judgeships. Had Judge Timbers voted against en
banc rehearing despite his position on the merits, “there would be no en banc
reconsideration of the important issues in the instant case.” Id. at 304–05.
38
For example, if there are six active judges voting in the en banc poll and one
senior status judge who would be eligible to participate only if the vote is
successful, four of the six active judges are required to initiate an en banc
rehearing. If successful, four of the seven participating judges are required to
produce a precedential opinion. If a judge—who would otherwise support the
panel opinion on the merits—feels that the issue is important enough to merit en
banc rehearing, he runs the risk of being the fourth vote in the en banc poll,
bringing the senior status judge into the equation. The senior status judge then
might join with the three other judges who voted for en banc, creating a majority
that could have been prevented by voting against en banc in the first place.
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efficiency.39 However, Second Circuit judges have frequently cited
tradition as the reason for many denials of rehearing en banc.40
Several chief judges of the Second Circuit have defended the
tradition of only rarely hearing cases en banc.41 However, most of
these chief judges have dissented from the denial of rehearing en
banc on at least one occasion.42 In voting to deny rehearing en banc
in Ricci v. DeStefano, Judge Katzmann approvingly referenced the
Second Circuit’s tradition and highlighted the value of deference to
panel opinions.43 However, Chief Judge Jacobs strenuously objected
to the use of tradition to justify denial of rehearing en banc.44
On several occasions, the Second Circuit has acknowledged the
importance of a case, but decided to wait for the Supreme Court to
decide on the certiorari petition before deciding whether to grant the
en banc rehearing.45 This first occurred in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,46 which was duly vacated by the Supreme Court.47 In a
39

See FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 20–21 (listing justifications
for the en banc that have been expressed by different judges).
40
See Newman III, supra note 21, at 503 (describing the “firmly established
tradition” of hearing few cases en banc).
41
See Michael B. de Leeuw & Samuel P. Groner, En Banc Review in the
Second Circuit, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 18, 2009 (discussing the views of several former
chief judges).
42
Since 1954, only Chief Judges Feinberg and Meskill have not authored at
least one published opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, but
both have voted to rehear cases en banc. See infra Table 2. On the other hand,
former Chief Judge Learned Hand stated that he never voted to rehear a case en
banc. See James Oakes, Personal Reflections on Learned Hand and the Second
Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 392 (1994) (“[A]ccording to Professor Gunther,
Hand never voted to convene a court en banc.”).
43
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2008) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[O]ur Circuit’s longstanding
tradition of general deference to panel adjudication—a tradition which holds
whether or not the judges of the Court agree with the panel’s disposition of the
matter before it. Throughout our history, we have proceeded to a full hearing en
banc only in rare and exceptional circumstances.”).
44
Id. at 93 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
(“[T]o rely on tradition to deny rehearing in banc starts to look very much like
abuse of discretion.”).
45
See Newman I, supra note 18, at 383 (“On at least two occasions, a majority
of the court has explicitly rejected in banc reconsideration of an important issue
precisely because of its confidence that the issue would engage the attention of the
Supreme Court.”).
46
See 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., concurring with the
denial of rehearing en banc) (“[W]e wisely speed this case on its way to the
Supreme Court as an exercise of sound, prudent and resourceful judicial
administration.”).
47
417 U.S. 156 (1974); see also infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
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1973 case, the Second Circuit explicitly denied en banc with the
expectation that the Supreme Court resolution was inevitable.48 In
1991’s International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
Chief Judge Oakes expressed doubt about the soundness of deferring
to a statutorily mandated en banc hearing.49 In 2004, the Second
Circuit originally denied the petition for rehearing en banc in
Muntaqim v. Coombe “without prejudice” to renewal after the
Supreme Court’s disposition of the certiorari petition.50 Judge Jacobs
questioned the legitimacy of denying en banc rehearing without
prejudice, which effectively circumvents the Supreme Court’s
position as “the Court of last resort.”51 After the Supreme Court
denied the petition for certiorari, the Second Circuit vacated the
panel opinion and reheard the case en banc.52
Between 2000 and 2010, the Second Circuit heard eight cases en
banc.53 This was roughly half the number of cases heard en banc by
the next nearest circuit—the First Circuit—during the same period,
despite the fact that the Second Circuit had nearly three times the
48

Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 553 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(“This Court has denied en banc . . . not because we believe these cases are
insignificant, but because they are of such extraordinary importance that we are
confident the Supreme Court will accept these matters under its certiorari
jurisdiction, as we correctly anticipated in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.”), rev’d,
430 U.S. 462 (1977).
49
925 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir. 1991) (Oakes, C.J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“I should suppose that rehearing en banc could be denied here
on the basis that the Supreme Court is sure to grant certiorari. That, it strikes me, is
not sound justification; better that our house be put in order without Supreme
Court intervention.”), aff'd, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
50
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385 F.3d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 2004) (Straub, Pooler,
Sack, Katzmann, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“While we
recognize that the suggestion to rehear this case in banc has failed, our concurrence
is specifically without prejudice to renewal by a judge or party after the Supreme
Court acts on the certiorari petitions now pending.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978
(2004), and order amended and superseded by 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004)
(granting rehearing en banc).
51
Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Unless
our in banc practice is to become a dead letter altogether, this is a circumstance in
which our full Court should convene. It is no proper solution for us to forgo in
banc review ‘without prejudice,’ and thus expressly reserve an opportunity to hear
the case as a full court if the Supreme Court does not: the Court of last resort is on
First Street, not on Foley Square.”).
52
449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam).
53
See FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 6. Table 1, infra, lists ten
cases, but Brown v. Andrews was dissolved before hearing, 220 F.3d 634, 635 (2d
Cir. 2000) (per curiam), and Hayden v. Pataki and Muntaqim v. Coombe were
consolidated for briefing and oral argument, 449 F.3d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2004) (en
banc) (per curiam).
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caseload of the First Circuit.54 In fact, year after year, the Second
Circuit consistently hears fewer cases en banc than every other
circuit in absolute terms, and far fewer cases when adjusted for
caseload.55
When the Second Circuit does endeavor to hear a case en banc,
the Supreme Court very rarely grants certiorari; only five times since
1970, and not at all since 1988.56 In three of those cases, the Supreme
Court summarily vacated the en banc opinion.57 The most recent,
United States v. Monsanto, was an en banc hearing that produced a
per curiam opinion and eight concurring and dissenting opinions.58
The Second Circuit’s en banc Monsanto decision, which created a
circuit split, was reversed by the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision.59
The rare number of times that certiorari is granted from a Second
Circuit en banc decision suggests that Second Circuit en banc courts
generally adjudicate to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court;
especially given the stringent standard the Second Circuit applies
when deciding whether to rehear the case. Therefore, increased en
banc review should actually reduce the number of cases the Supreme
Court finds necessary to accept.
B. The Mini En Banc
In order to allow a three-judge panel to issue opinions that
would otherwise require a full en banc hearing, nine of the thirteen
federal circuits—including the Second Circuit—have adopted an
informal version of en banc review, commonly known as the “mini
en banc.”60 Though the procedures vary by circuit, the mini en banc
is typically employed when the panel is overruling the law of the
54

The First Circuit heard eighteen en banc cases between 2000–2010, out of
9,773 total, compared to the Second Circuit’s 27,856 total cases. See FEDERAL BAR
COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 6.
55
See id. at 5–8 for graphs and tables depicting the disparity in statistics
between the Second Circuit and her sister circuits.
56
See infra Table 1.
57
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev’d sub
nom., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919 (1973); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F.2d
1133 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc), vacated sub nom., United States v. Hopkins, 418
U.S. 909 (1974); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated
sub nom., City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
58
852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 491 U.S. 600
(1989).
59
491 U.S. 600 (1989).
60
See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the
Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
713, 714–15 (2009).

LUCERO, FINAL

2013

4/25/2013 9:06 PM

THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S EN BANC CRISIS

43

circuit61 or creating a circuit split.62 In this procedure, a draft panel
opinion is circulated among all active judges in the circuit and any
judge may request a vote.63 If the vote is successful, a formal en banc
is conducted; otherwise the panel opinion is published.64 Some
circuits, such as the Seventh, require the published opinion to include
a mention of fact that the opinion was circulated and whether no vote
was requested or that a vote was conducted that did not result in a
majority of judges voting to rehear the case en banc.65 However,
other circuits have been criticized for lacking transparency because
they do not indicate the use of this procedure.66
Since their first use of the mini en banc in 1966, the Second
Circuit has employed the procedure on at least seventy occasions.67
This level of usage is more than twice every other circuit apart from
the Seventh.68 Only the Second and Seventh Circuits utilize the mini
en banc more often than the traditional formal en banc.69 Yet, unlike
the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit does not have a local rule
addressing the mini en banc and does not have a consistent procedure
for noting the use of the mini en banc in the opinion.70 The mini en
banc procedure does not preclude a dissent from denial of rehearing
en banc; in fact after an opinion is circulated, a judge may institute
an en banc vote.71

61

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See Sloan, supra note 60, at 766.
63
See id. at 725–26.
64
See id.
65
See 7TH CIR. R. 40(e) (“A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this
court adopting a position which would overrule a prior decision of this court or
create a conflict between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first
circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them do not
vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be adopted. In the
discretion of the panel, a proposed opinion which would establish a new rule or
procedure may be similarly circulated before it is issued. When the position is
adopted by the panel after compliance with this procedure, the opinion, when
published, shall contain a footnote worded, depending on the circumstances, in
substance as follows: This opinion has been circulated among all judges of this
court in regular active service. (No judge favored, or, A majority did not favor) a
rehearing en banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v. Roe.)”).
66
See generally Sloan, supra note 60 (arguing that the use of the mini en banc
procedure must be accompanied by an indication of its use).
67
See id. at 728 fig.1.
68
See id.
69
See id.
70
See id. at 756.
71
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
62
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C. The Dissent from the Denial of Rehearing En Banc
Typically, the votes of the individual judges in an en banc poll
are not published. However, the publication of dissents from—and
concurrences with72—the denial of rehearing en banc is a method
judges employ to circumvent that custom.73 Some judges openly
question the propriety of publishing such opinions.74 The Second
Circuit began publishing these opinions in 1958, two years after their
first en banc rehearing.75 No comprehensive list of dissents from
denial of rehearing en banc has been previously published, so the
cases generating these opinions are listed in tabular form in the
appendix of this Note.76
Over the next five years Judge Clarke authored seven dissents
from the denial of rehearing en banc.77 The first of those was
Glenmore v. Ahern.78 This opinion was criticized by Chief Judge
Lumbard and Judges Friendly and Moore, who questioned whether
Judge Clarke had the authority to publish a dissent, because he was
72

On most occasions, any concurrence is a direct response to the dissent.
However, there have been occasions where the denial was accompanied by a
purely explanatory opinion. See, e.g., Boudin v. Thomas, 737 F.2d 261 (2d Cir.
1984) (Newman, J., concurring in the rejection of rehearing en banc); United States
v. Danzey, 622 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1980) (statement of Mansfield, Oakes,
Newman, Kearse, JJ.).
73
See Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En Banc Decisionmaking, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 331 (2006) (“The issuance of such opinions as a safety valve to
a strict rule forbidding the revelation of vote tallies on en banc petitions is not
without controversy.”).
74
Id. (“Judge James Hill of the Eleventh Circuit, in his own opinion dissenting
from a denial of rehearing en banc, questioned whether such opinions should be
issued at all.”).
75
Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d 136, 155 (2d Cir. 1958)
(statement of Clark, C.J. & Waterman, J.) (disagreeing with the court’s
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 46), vacated, 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
76
See infra Table 2.
77
Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1959); United States
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1960); Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Dixon Textiles Corp., 280 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1960); Puddu v. Royal
Netherlands S.S. Co., 303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962); Nuzzo v. Rederi, 304 F.2d 506
(2d Cir. 1962); Walters v. Moore-McCormack, 312 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1963);
Grayson-Robinson Stores v. S.E.C., 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
78
276 F.2d 525, 549 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“I am not enamored
of in banc proceedings; in the particular cases where we have tried them, they
appear to have raised more questions than they have settled. But so long as we do
order them at least occasionally, it would appear that a decision such as this on a
continually recurring issue of practice, against so many strong precedents and
reasons of policy, is one made to order for such procedure if any case is.”),
overruled by Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1966) (en banc).
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not a member of the original three-judge panel.79 Another case,
Puddu v. Royal Netherlands Steamship Co.80 was—after further
reflection by the court—later reheard en banc, though the en banc
court eventually adopted the panel opinion.81 In five of these seven
dissents, Judge Clark garnered the vote of at least one other judge.82
However, after 1963, there were no recorded dissents from the denial
of rehearing en banc for the remainder of the 1960s.
The early 1970s saw the appointment of Judges Timbers and
Oakes to the Second Circuit by President Nixon.83 That decade also
saw a marked change in the volume of dissents from denial of
rehearing en banc, with nineteen cases giving rise to a dissenting
opinion.84 At least fourteen of those dissenting opinions were
authored by either Judge Timbers or Judge Oakes, which raises the
inference that the Second Circuit’s en banc history is strongly driven
by a few individual judges.85 Although vote counts are not available
in all instances, at least six of these judges’ opinions were explicitly
joined by the other.86 Furthermore, Judge Oakes has never authored
79

Id. at 553 (statement of Friendly. J.) (“We feel obliged to note that the
course which had brought this to us would mean that any active judge may publish
a dissent from any decision, although he did not participate in it and the Court has
declined to review it en banc thereafter, a practice which seems to us of dubious
policy especially since, if the issue is of real importance, further opportunities for
expression will assuredly occur.”); Id. at 557 (“Chief Judge LUMBARD joins in
this opinion. Judge MOORE, not having participated in the decision, deems it
inappropriate that he comment as to the merits; however, he joins us in considering
that an en banc should not have been granted here and also in regretting
inauguration of a practice of writing opinions with respect to an en banc vote.”).
80
303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962).
81
1962 A.M.C. 1194 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per curiam).
82
Glenmore v. Ahern, 276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1960) (joined by Judge
Waterman); Nuzzo v. Rederi, 304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962) (joined by Judge
Smith); Walters v. Moore-McCormack, 312 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1963) (joined by
Judges Smith & Marshall); Greyson-Robinson Stores v. SEC, 320 F.2d 940 (2d
Cir. 1963) (joined by Judges Smith & Hays).
83
Four Nixon appointees joined the Second Circuit in 1971. Along with
Judges Timbers and Oakes, Judges Mansfield and Mulligan were also seated that
year. By the end of 1974, the only remaining judges from before 1971 were (then
Chief) Judge Kaufman and (now Senior) Judge Feinberg.
84
See infra Table 2.
85
See id.
86
United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
907 (1980); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); ChrisCraft v. Piper Aircraft, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 910
(1973); Zahn v. Int’l Paper, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff’d, 414 U.S. 291
(1973) superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); Scenic Hudson Preserv.
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or joined an opinion concurring with the denial of rehearing en banc.
Judge Timbers has joined three such opinions—all of which featured
Judge Oakes either authoring or concurring with the dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc.87
There were four cases in the 1970s with published dissents from
denial of rehearing en banc where the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.88 Of those four cases, the high court affirmed only one,
Zahn v. International Paper.89 In Zahn, despite the support of a
majority of voting judges, rehearing was denied because the rules at
the time required a majority of all active judges, regardless of
whether they were participating in the en banc poll.90
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Judge Oakes, joined by Judges
Hays and Timbers, dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc.91
Chief Judge Kaufman, in his concurrence with denial of rehearing en
banc, agreed that the case was of national importance,92 but justified
the denial of rehearing on banc by stating that the Supreme Court
would surely grant certiorari and resolve this important issue.93 Sure
enough, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and eventually vacated
the panel opinion, issuing a landmark decision regarding notice
requirements for class action lawsuits.94
In the same term, Judge Timbers also authored a dissent from
Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972).
87
Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975);
Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1975); Gilliard v. Oswald, 557 F.2d
359 (2d Cir. 1977).
88
See infra Table 2.
89
414 U.S. at 302. The holding in Zahn was later overturned by Congress’s
enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 566 (“We hold that
§ 1367 by its plain text overruled . . . Zahn . . . .”).
90
See Newman I, supra note 18, at 368 n.14 (“When the vote was taken to
decide whether to hear Zahn in banc, the Second Circuit had one vacancy and one
active judge was disqualified. Because the four active judges voting for an in banc
were not a majority of either the seven active judges participating or the eight
active judges then serving, Zahn may be viewed as a ruling that the base for
determining a majority is the number of active judges serving, even if one is
disqualified, rather than a majority of the authorized complement, even when one
vacancy exists.”).
91
Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1021 (Oakes, J. dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc).
92
See id. at 1020 (Kaufman, J. concurring) (“I vote against en banc, not
because I believe this case is unimportant, but because the case is of such
extraordinary consequence that I am confident the Supreme Court will take this
matter under its certiorari jurisdiction.”).
93
See id.
94
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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denial of rehearing en banc of a panel opinion in a civil rights case
that was later granted certiorari and reversed.95 Judge Timbers
authored the dissent at the original panel level and his dissent was
joined by three other members of the Second Circuit, leaving the
vote tied—four votes for rehearing and four against. In fact, on at
least five occasions in the 1970s, no majority existed for denying
rehearing en banc.
Gilliard v. Oswald highlights the undermining effect of a dissent
from the denial of rehearing en banc.96 In that case, Judge Oakes
authored the dissent and Chief Judge Kaufman authored a
concurrence with the denial of rehearing en banc.97 In a separate
concurrence, Judge Timbers expressed the view that Kaufman’s
opinion undermined the panel opinion, especially since seven of nine
judges voted against the en banc rehearing.98
Judge Timbers left active service in 1979. Although Judge
Oakes remained in active service through 1992, the frequency of
dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc sharply fell during the
period from 1980 through 1992. Thirteen cases produced such
opinions, four of which resulted in certiorari grants.99 The interesting
feature of this decade was that Chief Judge Jon O. Newman, who
often commented with disapproval on the practice,100 authored
opinions in six of these cases.
After 1992, it was over six years before the next dissent from
denial of rehearing en banc appeared in the Second Circuit.101
However, since 1999 the practice of authoring dissents and
concurrences from the denial of rehearing en banc has returned. In
95

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973).
557 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1977).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 360–61 (Timbers, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I
likewise disagree with the Chief Judge’s advance attempt to narrow the scope of
the court’s panel majority holding . . . . With deference, I should think each case
that comes before us should be decided on its own particular facts, as Judge
Moore’s characteristically thoughtful panel majority opinion did in the instant case.
And the precedential effect of a prior decision of this Court, in my view, should be
determined by traditional considerations which are deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence.”).
99
Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 646 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 457 U.S. 853
(1982); McCray v. Adams, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001
(1986); Int’l Soc'y for Krishna v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S.
672 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S.
317 (1992).
100
See, e.g., In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 869 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir.
1989) (Newman, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“[A]
statement of reasons for such a dissent is often neither needed nor useful.”).
101
See infra Table 2.
96
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less than thirteen years, twenty cases produced dissents from denial
of rehearing en banc.102 In contrast to the relatively high rate of
certiorari grants in the 1980s, certiorari was denied in every case
from 1999 until 2005.103 This suggests that judges were initially
authoring dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc for cases that
were not of such exceptional importance that normally justifies
rehearing.
However, since 2005, that analysis has shifted. In the past seven
years, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in six cases where
there was a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc and denied
certiorari in only five cases.104 Of the six grants, three were reversed
and three more are pending as of the time of this writing.105 In these
cases, the natural conclusion is that judges are now more accurately
identifying cases that merit rehearing en banc.
D. The Views of the Current Second Circuit Judges
The current active judges on the Second Circuit have developed
distinctive patterns reflecting their judicial philosophies regarding
the en banc procedure in general, as well as the practice of authoring
opinions relating to the denial of rehearing en banc. Table 3 compiles
the publically available information regarding the voting records of
the current judges.106 Examining the relative frequency of these votes
and the judges’ published views on opinions relating to the denial of
rehearing en banc provides insight into the differences of opinion
that exist among the current judges in the Second Circuit.
In 2000, after eight years on the Second Circuit, current Chief
Judge Dennis Jacobs expressed his opposition to opinions related to
the denial of rehearing en banc.107 However, he now has written six
opinions dissenting and three concurring from the denial of rehearing
en banc—more than any other current judge.108 Despite the fact that

102

See infra Table 2.
Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom., Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
104
See infra Table 2.
105
See id..
106
See infra Table 3.
107
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Opinions pro and con on the denial
of rehearing belong to a deservedly neglected genre.”).
108
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 200 (2d Cir. 2011); Rosario
v. Ercole, 617 F.3d 683, 685 (2d Cir. 2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 92
(2d Cir. 2008); Zhong v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 489 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 2007);
Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2005); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385
F.3d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 2004) and concurred with the denial of rehearing en banc in
103
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the Second Circuit has continued to hear en banc cases at the same
low rate, Judge Jacobs has recently been willing to express his
frustration at the Second Circuit’s traditional reluctance to rehear
cases en banc. Judge Jacobs has authored or joined an opinion
dissenting from or concurring with the denial of rehearing en banc on
the majority of cases where such an opinion was published. By 2007,
Judge Jacobs was openly bemoaning the cumbersome tradition that
effectively immunized Second Circuit panel decisions from en banc
review.109 In a 2008 dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in
Ricci v. Destefano, he reiterated his frustration with the tradition,
explaining that the Second Circuit should be willing to rehear cases
that are clearly important enough to merit Supreme Court review.110
In 2009, the Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc in Watson
v. Geren, issuing a per curium opinion reiterating that en banc
rehearing should be reserved for only the very most important cases
that implicate “the development of law and the administration of
justice.”111 Judge Raggi, joined by Chief Judge Jacobs and Judges
Cabranes and Livingston, dissented.112 Judge Raggi primarily argued
that the panel erred; she did not attribute her dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc to the importance of the case or a circuit split.113
Since joining the Second Circuit in 2002, Judge Raggi has
authored a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in five of the
cases that contained at least one such opinion.114 She has further
joined five dissents authored by other judges.115 Judge Cabranes has

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Stewart, 597 F.3d 514, 515 (2d Cir. 2010); Brown, 235 F.3d at 777.
109
Zhong, 489 F.3d at 139 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“[O]ur in banc practice is so rusty and cumbersome that its
desuetude will allow a single panel to skate past full court review.”).
110
Ricci, 530 F.3d at 93 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) (“I do not think it is enough for us to dilate on exceptionally important
issues in a sheaf of concurrences and dissents arguing over the denial of in banc
review. If issues are important enough to warrant Supreme Court review, they are
important enough for our full Court to consider and decide on the merits.”).
111
Watson v. Geren, 587 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“En banc
review should be limited generally to only those cases that raise issues of important
systemic consequences for the development of the law and the administration of
justice. We respectfully suggest that this is not one of those cases.”).
112
Id. (Raggi, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
113
Id. at 164.
114
Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2011); Watson,
587 F.3d 160; Policiano v. Herbert, 453 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2006); Landell v.
Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2005).
115
See infra Table 3.
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authored six dissents from denial of rehearing en banc since 1998.116
Like Judges Raggi and Jacobs, Judge Cabranes’s dissents have been
lengthy and reached the merits of the underlying cases.117
Judge Pooler has authored four dissents from denial of rehearing
en banc since 1994.118 However, Judge Pooler’s opinions regarding
the denial of rehearing en banc differ from the other prolific
dissenters because rather than addressing the underlying merits of the
case, she frequently includes only a relatively short statement
describing the reason for her position.119 In United States v. Stewart,
she expressed unambiguous disdain for the practice of expounding
on the issues and undermining the panel opinion, comparing the nonprecedential nature of these opinions to “a letter to the editor of their
favorite local newspaper.”120 In Arkansas Carpenters Health and
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, Judge Pooler’s panel opinion
acknowledged that the three judge panel was constrained by the law
of the circuit doctrine, but suggested that the appellants should

116

Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 678 F.3d
127, 128 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Stewart, 597 F.3d 514, 520 (2d Cir.
2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2008); Landell, 406 F.3d at
179; United States v. Lynch, 181 F.3d 330, 332 (2d Cir. 1999).
117
See, e.g., Ricci, 530 F.3d at 93 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc).
118
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779, 779
(2d Cir. 2010); Rosario v. Ercole, 617 F.3d 683, 688 (2d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 295 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Martin, 430 F.3d 73, 75
(2d Cir. 2005).
119
See, e.g., Fell, 571 F.3d at 295 (Pooler, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (noting in a brief opinion that while in favor of a rehearing en
banc, he did not join Judge Calabresi’s lengthy dissent); Martin, 430 F.3d at 75
(Pooler, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“I would not dissent
after being on the losing side of an in banc poll if I did not believe that the decision
in Martin sets a perilous and plainly wrong precedent.”).
120
597 F.3d at 519 (Pooler, J. concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
(“The nostra sponte en banc poll, predicated on the rationale set forth in the
dissent, did not succeed. The majority opinion therefore stands. As pointed out in
the majority opinion, the district court should, of course, take account of the panel
dissent. But the decision of the panel is the law of the Circuit for this case on
remand and for future cases, unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court
or by this Court en banc. Opinions dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc are
not uncommon in this Circuit. They are nonetheless oddities. When such an
opinion is filed, there is an extant panel decision resolving the appeal. The active
judges declined to revisit that decision en banc. The panel decision is therefore the
Court’s decision. Other judges may have views on the matter, but the case is not
before them, and what they may say about it has as much force of law as if those
views were published in a letter to the editor of their favorite local newspaper.”).

LUCERO, FINAL

2013

4/25/2013 9:06 PM

THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S EN BANC CRISIS

51

petition for en banc to allow the court to reexamine its precedent.121
When the Second Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc,
Judge Pooler dissented and noted the agreement of the other two
members of the panel, Senior Judges Newman and Parker.122 The
panel could have used the mini en banc procedure instead of
deferring to a poll of the entire court.123 The subsequent opinion
overturning the previous precedent would have likely remained
undisturbed.124
At the other end of the spectrum, Judge Katzmann had not
authored or joined an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc in over a decade of active service, when he authored a short
opinion in 2011, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.125 Conversely, he has authored
five opinions concurring with the denial of rehearing en banc and
joined three more, the most among active judges.126 These opinions,
two of which were coauthored with Judge Sack, were each brief and
simply defended the Second Circuit’s tradition of rarely hearing
cases en banc.127
Judge Wesley has joined six dissents from denial of rehearing
en banc, but authored only one dissent—a secondary dissent to Judge
Raggi’s dissent in Policiano—since 2004.128 Judge Lynch has
considered opinions usually unnecessary, but valuable in the absence

121

604 F.3d 98, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“In sum, as long as
Tamoxifen is controlling law, plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. However, we believe there are
compelling reasons to revisit Tamoxifen with the benefit of the full Court’s
consideration of the difficult questions at issue and the important interests at stake.
We therefore invite the plaintiffs-appellants to petition for rehearing in banc.”).
122
625 F.3d 779, 779 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2010).
123
See supra Part I.B.
124
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
125
Judge Katzmann’s short dissent highlighted the 5-5 vote in the en banc poll
and explained that the panel majority’s conclusion—relying primarily on an
expansive reading of Katzmann’s reasoning made in a previous concurrence—was
unfounded and not logically required. 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Katzmann, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
126
See infra Table 3.
127
See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 167 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sack,
Katzmann, JJ., concurring in the decision to deny rehearing en banc) (“[W]e think
the Court has rightly decided to respect what Judge Newman referred to as the
‘Virtues of Restraint.’”).
128
Joined: Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011); Ark.
Carpenters, 629 F.3d 779; Ricci, 530 F.3d 88; Landell, 406 F.3d 159; Ramos v.
Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2004). Authored: Policiano, 453 F.3d 79.
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of a panel dissent.129 His lone dissent occurred in Kiobel, where the
concurring panel author was ineligible to participate in the en banc
poll.130 In Judge Hall’s lone dissent, in Amnesty International, he
appeared to distance himself from the three lengthy dissenting
opinions written by his colleagues.131 Judge Livingston has authored
two dissents from denial of rehearing en banc.132 The dissents cited
circuit precedent or the creation of a circuit split as the Rule 35
justification for en banc rehearing. To date, the three newest judges
on the Second Circuit, Judges Chin, Lohier, and Carney, have not
authored opinions regarding the denial of rehearing en banc.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Judicial Economy Function
In order to understand the reasons that dissents from denial en
banc occur, it is important to understand the motivations that drive
judicial decision-making. Only then can one truly analyze the costs
and benefits of the practice of issuing such opinions. Judges, like all
professionals, are members of a labor market, albeit one that differs
significantly from the typical model.133 The “buyers” are the
politicians who appoint them on behalf of the constituents.134 Federal
circuit court of appeals judges—like all Article III judges—serve
during “good behavior,” which essentially equates to a life term.135
129

Amnesty Int’l, 667 F.3d at 164 (Lynch, J., concurring in the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“While I usually consider opinions concurring in a denial of en
banc review unnecessary, I write briefly in response to my colleagues’ dissents
from denial of rehearing en banc because, in the absence of any panel dissent,
some of their criticisms have not previously been aired.”).
130
642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (short opinion referencing Senior Judge Leval’s “scholarly and
eloquent concurring opinion”).
131
Amnesty Int’l, 667 F.3d at 204 (Hall, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc) (“I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing in banc
solely because I believe this case ‘involves a question of exceptional importance’
warranting in banc review. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).”).
132
Amnesty Int’l, 667 F.3d 163; United States v. Whitten, 623 F.3d 125 (2d
Cir. 2010).
133
See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 57 (2008) (Theories of
judicial behavior “can be integrated by conceiving of the judge as a worker, and
thus a participant in a labor market . . . .”).
134
See id.
135
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”); see also United
States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001) (“[F]ederal judges appointments [are]
during good Behaviour—the practical equivalent of life tenure.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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After appointment and confirmation, they are no longer subject to the
same external constrains present in most labor markets.136 Excepting
the infrequent case of a circuit judge aspiring for appointment to the
Supreme Court, the executive and legislative branches have no
control over a sitting judge.137 Therefore, the “buying side” of the
labor market is effectively out of the equation after appointment and
Senate confirmation. Without the power to influence the decisions of
the vast majority of federal judges, the legislative and executive
branches are effectively making a long-term purchase. There is no
opportunity for buyer’s remorse.138
The “sellers” in this labor market—the judicial nominees and
sitting judges—receive a far lower monetary compensation than their
qualifications would permit them to earn in private practice or
academia, so it is unlikely that many aspire to become judges for
monetary gain.139 They therefore must agree to provide their services
for certain nonpecuniary compensation, such as deference, power,
leisure, intellectual stimulation, public recognition, job security,
independence, and, perhaps most importantly, the desire to be a
“good judge.”140
Judge Posner argues that the motivation to be a “good judge” is
supported by the tremendous judicial output of many judges despite
the apparent opportunity to live a “leisured judicial life” and to retire
at full pay.141 Although this may be in part due to a desire for
notoriety or promotion, most of these hard-working judges toil in
relative obscurity.142 Posner asserts that judges are in this way
similar to artists, who also derive significant intrinsic satisfaction
from their work.143 This notion of “good judging” is a driving force
136

See POSNER, supra note 133, at 58 (“Once appointed . . . a federal judge,
being well insulated from both carrots and sticks, has no incentive to decide cases
in such a way as to advance anyone’s political goals besides his own—if he has
such goals.”).
137
See id. at 58–59.
138
For an illustration of the classic case of buyer’s remorse, compare Thomas
Jefferson’s pre-presidential belief that judicial terms should be for life with his
post-Marbury argument that judges should be elected and serve six-year terms.
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 715 (1995).
139
Id. at 59 (“[Judges] could command a higher salary in a law practice or
even in teaching law.”).
140
Id. at 59–61.
141
Id. at 61 (explaining that if judges continue to work after retirement age,
they are “working for nothing”).
142
Id. at 62.
143
Id.; see also Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion
Readers, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“A judicial opinion performs as well as
it explains . . . . [I]t becomes a performative utterance.”).
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that shapes every stage of the decision-making process. The result of
the decision-making process is manifested in the written opinion.
B. The Audience for Judicial Opinions
When a judge writes an opinion, he does so with a wide variety
of audiences in mind.144 The lawyers and parties, especially the
losing party or a lower judge whose opinion is reversed, expect a
justification for any adverse ruling.145 Practicing attorneys rely on
written opinions to craft future arguments and develop their
understanding of the law.146 Similarly, law students rely heavily on
opinions to develop their understanding of legal principles.147 Fellow
judges on panels must be convinced to join an opinion or persuaded
to abandon a contrary position.148 While reviewing judges must be
satisfied that the opinion was well grounded in law, judges in lower
courts and sister circuits rely on the opinion’s precedential or
persuasive guidance.149 Legislators and political scientists also use
opinions in the political arena.150 In cases of national prominence,
members of the general public are exposed to the judiciary through
the lens of the media.151 Finally the judge who writes the opinion
may use the writing process as a method to develop a justification for
the decisions he made before setting out to actually write.152

144

See Robert A. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 810, 813–14 (1961).
145
See Aldisert, supra note 143, at 17.
146
Id. at 19 (“Lawyers . . . look for prediction as to the course of future
decisions.”).
147
Id. (“Law school faculties and students also seek the opinions as study tools
and research materials.”).
148
Id. at 18 (“The opinion writer . . . should at all times consider . . . judge’s
colleagues on the court.”).
149
Id. at 19 (“[Secondary consumers of judicial opinions] vary. Some are
institutions in the same judicial hierarchy, some are at a higher rung, some
lower.”).
150
Id. (stating that opinions are used by “state legislators and academics in
many fields, among them political scientists”).
151
Id. (“Representatives of the print and electronic media are counted among
opinion readers.”).
152
See Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate
Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 218 (1957) (“I have not found a better test for the
solution of a case than its articulation in writing, which is thinking at its hardest. A
judge . . . often discovers that his tentative views will not jell in the writing. He
wrestles with the devil more than once to set forth a sound opinion that will be
sufficient unto more than the day.”); see also Leflar, supra note 144, at 814 (“[T]he
writing judge [writes] to satisfy himself that his decision is right.”).
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C. The Judicial Economy Function Applied to Dissents
The same potential audiences for opinions in general apply to
dissents as well. A dissent tells the losing party that the legal issue
was close, and may therefore encourage an appeal. Attorneys may
perceive a dissent as an opportunity to persuade future panels or the
en banc court to overrule the opinion’s precedent or persuade a sister
circuit to adopt a different rule of law.153 The dissent may have been
an attempt to persuade fellow panel members to abandon the view
held by the majority and supplant the original putative majority
opinion.154 Conversely, some dissents began as draft majority
opinions, but later became dissents after losing the support of one or
more judges.155 Dissents also help strengthen the majority opinion by
forcing it to address counterarguments.156 The threat of dissent
ensures that ideologically opposed judges conform their opinions to
existing precedent.157
The varied readers of judicial opinions are affected by dissents
in different ways. Law students read dissents and learn that there are
other points of view beyond the rule set forth by the majority.
Legislators and academics may perceive the dissent as a call to
action, to remedy a perceived injustice of the majority opinion. The
public learns of importance of judicial nominations through the
knowledge that a case is closely divided. The dissenter may simply
be satisfying his own desires to vindicate his beliefs. A judge’s
personal belief in the correctness of his minority view may lead him
to author a dissent to propagate that view. This may result in a
dilution of the effect of the majority opinion.158 Most of these readers
are indirectly influenced by the dissents they read over a relatively
long term.
In the short term, a dissenting opinion at the court of appeals
level—especially when the dissent is from the denial of rehearing en
153

HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 76 (2006).
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
CASES 161 (1996) (describing the Supreme Court’s decision-making process in
Lochner, where Justice Peckham’s circulated draft dissent convinced one of the
Justices to abandon the original five Justice majority, relegating Justice Harlan’s
draft opinion of the Court to a dissent).
155
See id. at 178–255 (describing several instances where a Supreme Court
Justice switched his vote after the initial conference).
156
See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision
Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1651 (2003).
157
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 176–78 (2003)
(describing “whistleblower” effect).
158
See Aldisert, supra note 143, at 29 (“[I]f the opinion writer is not careful in
phrasing the issue, a dissenter may complain and dilute the efficacy of the
opinion.”).
154
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banc—can also have an influential short-term effect: signaling to the
Supreme Court that certiorari should be granted and the majority
opinion ought to be reversed.159 The efficacy—or perceived
efficacy—of this signaling effect160 creates an important incentive
for judges to author dissents.161
Though there are clearly benefits, the decision to dissent is not
costless for the judges, so despite the many reasons a judge may
choose to author a dissent, court of appeals judges generally avoid
doing so.162 The time spent authoring a dissent detracts from time
that could otherwise be spent improving other, precedential opinions
or pursuing other non-judicial interests such as academic writing or
leisure activities.163 The dissent may magnify the majority opinion
and paradoxically make it more significant.164 Furthermore, the
dissent could potentially lead to disharmony and lasting negative
feelings among the judge’s colleagues.165 The importance of
collegiality and managing workload at the court of appeals level
results in far fewer dissents per opinion than at the Supreme Court,
even though circuit-level panels are frequently composed of
nominees from presidents of opposing political parties.166
Because each judge places different values on these factors,
there should be an observable propensity of certain judges to author
dissents, while other judges tend to refrain from doing so. At the
extreme, some judges may systematically avoid even joining
published dissents, even when the immediate cost of doing so is quite
low. This makes sense, especially when a judge holds a swing vote.
159

See HETTINGER, supra note 153, at 76–77 (“[P]ersuasive evidence exits
regarding the Supreme Court’s case-selection process to suggest that lower court
dissent has significant meaning for the justices as well.”).
160
See infra Part II.D.
161
See HETTINGER, supra note 153, at 77.
162
See POSNER, supra note 133, at 32.
163
See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1733 (1997) (“[I]t may be that a judge who sits with
two colleagues from the other party moderates his or her views in order to avoid
having to write a dissent.”); see also Indraneel Sur, How Far Do Voices Carry:
Dissents from Denial of Rehearing En Banc, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1360 (2006)
(“The most elementary cost of a dissenting opinion is incurred in valuable judicial
time.”).
164
See POSNER, supra note 133, at 32.
165
See id.; see also Edwards, supra note 156, at 1659 (“[J]udges who are
would-be dissenters go along with the views of the panel in order either to avoid
having to write a dissent, or to help foster a climate in which they will be less
likely to have to respond to future dissents when their preferred ideological
position finds itself in the majority.”).
166
See Edwards, supra note 156, at 1651; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 157,
at 167 (describing the conformity effect).
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A judge will avoid triggering a rehearing in a situation where he
otherwise agrees with the dissenting opinion. In a system like the
Supreme Court’s certiorari “rule of four,” where a majority is not
required to grant certiorari, the swing vote may refrain from
providing the final vote to grant when the ultimate outcome is a fait
accompli, which often occurs when the likely vote of the majority
has already been made known in a previous opinion.167
D. Signalling, Developing the Issue for the Supreme Court,
and Article III Concerns
The dissenting judge is often directing the opinion to the
Supreme Court, especially the clerks who read the petitions for
certiorari and have tremendous influence over the ultimate
disposition.168 Dissents—whether from the panel opinion or from the
denial of rehearing en banc—will, at a minimum, prompt a closer
read.169 This is especially true when the dissent’s author is known to
167

For example, in Liles v. Oregon, Justice Stevens declined to become the
fourth vote by joining Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, because the
position of the other five Justices was clear. 425 U.S. 963, 963–64 (1976) (Stevens,
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that the
majority of the Court which decided Miller v. California, is any less adamant than
the minority. Accordingly, regardless of how I might vote on the merits after full
argument, it would be pointless to grant certiorari in case after case of this
character only to have Miller reaffirmed time after time.”) (citations omitted); see
also Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227,
1270–71 (1979) (explaining that Justice Brennan employed the same reasoning in
the pornography cases in the 1970s).
168
See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE 90 (2006)
(describing the influence of Supreme Court clerks because of their extensive role
in reviewing certiorari petitions); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN,
SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 126 (2006) (explaining that because of the delegation of
analyzing certiorari petitions to clerks, Justice Stevens does “not even look at the
papers in over eighty percent of the cases that are filed”).
169
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 133, 144 (1990) (“If further review is discretionary, as in the U.S. Supreme
Court, a separate opinion may signal to the Court that the case is troubling and
perhaps worthy of a place on its calendar.”); see also Sur, supra note 163, at 1347
(“[T]he Supreme Court, unable to monitor every decision churned out by the
circuits, may rely on dissents in [lower] courts as red flags, warning it about
especially urgent questions that need authoritative answers.”). There are at least
thirty Supreme Court cases that quoted or mentioned the dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc. All but three of these cases have been decided since 1990. See,
e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates, 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1429 (2010) (citing Seventh
Circuit Judge Posner’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 349 (2002)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski’s dissent from
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the clerk, through reputation or personal knowledge.170 Therefore,
there is great incentive for a judge seeking to overturn the panel
opinion to produce a dissent that captures the notice of the decisionmakers at the Supreme Court.171 In any case, there is a statistical
correlation between dissents from denial of rehearing en banc and
grants of certiorari.172 In the cases where certiorari is granted, the
Court frequently quotes from the dissent from denial of rehearing en
banc.173
Websites and blogs have added a new dimension to this effect.
The operators of SCOTUSblog174 and How Appealing175 scour the
opinions of the courts of appeals searching for dissents and circuit
splits.176 Parties, assuming that the clerks take note of this
information, lobby to have their petitions for certiorari featured on
the blogs.177
En banc opinions further develop the issues for the Supreme
Court.178 Because an order regarding the denial of rehearing en banc
denial of rehearing en banc); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 346 (2000) (citing
Seventh Circuit Judge Easterbrook’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc). A
Second Circuit dissent from denial en banc has been cited only once, in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156, 180 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(citing Judge Oakes’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc).
170
Of the thirty cases located, nine of the references were to opinions authored
by just three judges: Judges Posner and Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit and
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit.
171
See Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An
Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 758 (2001) (“The data indicate that the
Supreme Court was more likely to grant certiorari when at least one judge issued a
dissenting opinion in the court immediately below the Supreme Court than when
no judge issued a dissenting opinion.”).
172
See Solimine, supra note 73, at 335.
173
Sur, supra note 163, at 1317–18.
174
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
175
HOW APPEALING, http://howappealing.law.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
176
See Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a Supreme Court
Bar and Its Effect on Certiorari, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 177 n.15 (2007)
(explaining how SCOTUSblog founder Tom Goldstein built his Supreme Court
litigation practice based on his understanding that the Supreme Court’s decision of
whether to grant certiorari relies heavily on circuit split). Carter Phillips, who has
argued over fifty cases in front of the Supreme Court, relies on dissents from denial
of rehearing en banc to persuade the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Id. at 184.
177
See Rachel C. Lee, Note, Ex Parte Blogging: The Legal Ethics of Supreme
Court Advocacy in the Internet Era, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1535, 1544 (2009)
(“[A]pproximately five to ten times every year, a party seeking certiorari urges
SCOTUSblog to highlight its case in a blog post.”) (citations omitted).
178
See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2003)
(Walker, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“These issues and
the arguments set forth in the majority opinion and Judge Winter’s dissent, which I
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is not intended to be a disposition on the merits, it may contain one
judge’s opinions on the merits and another’s opinion on the
importance of the case and whether it deserves en banc
consideration. The original panel opinion was authored and approved
by the panel of judges who considered the parties’ briefs and were
present at the oral argument. Contrast this to a dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc, where a judge may be approaching the
issue with no more information than anyone else presented with the
panel opinion. When a panel dissent exists, the dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc often does not add significantly to the original
dissenting opinion.179
The cost of these opinions is significant. Rather than simply
conducting a poll to determine whether a majority of judges favors
en banc rehearing, a dissenting opinion frequently prompts the panel
majority author to defend his opinion.180 When that author is
unavailable, another judge opposed to rehearing frequently performs
this task.181 This serves as an invitation to other judges in the circuit
to weigh in on the issues. Essentially, as judges join the various
opinions, the court performs a de facto en banc. However, this de
facto en banc produces non-precedential opinions, outside the normal
adversarial process.
Not only are the opinions non-precedential, they can seriously
undermine the panel opinion. At the conclusion of the publication of
believe merit Supreme Court review, would have benefitted from consideration by
the full court before they are presented by certiorari to the Supreme Court.”).
179
See, e.g., Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev.,
678 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2012) (Pooler, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing
en banc) (“I write in response to the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc,
which adds little to Judge Straub’s dissent from the panel’s opinion.”).
180
See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 13 (2002) [hereinafter “Kozinski Statement”] (statement of Alex
Kozinski, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)
(“[A]n en banc call consumes substantial court resources. The judge making the
call circulates one or more memos criticizing the opinion . . . . Frequently, other
judges circulate memoranda in support or opposition before the vote. Many of
these memos are as complex and extensive as the opinion itself.”); see also Sur,
supra note 163, at 1327 (“[A] judge who disfavors rehearing will often write a
response to defend the panel.”).
181
In Alliance for Open Soc’y, Senior Judge Parker wrote the panel opinion.
651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011). Because of his senior status, he was ineligible to
participate in the en banc poll, though he would have been able to participate in the
en banc rehearing if the poll had been successful. See supra notes 33–34 and
accompanying text. Judge Pooler, who joined Judge Parker’s original panel
opinion, wrote the opinion concurring in denial of rehearing en banc. 651 F.3d at
131.
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the opinions regarding the en banc poll, the panel opinion remains
the precedential law of the circuit. However, the non-precedential
opinions often compete with the original panel opinion for the
attention of the media, the academy, sister circuits, and the Supreme
Court.182 The non-precedential opinions sometimes even purport to
“clarify” the panel opinion, without actually modifying it.183 These
have been criticized as highly political rants.184
When the en banc poll is not prompted by a petition by one of
the parties, the opinions may not even be legitimate. Judge Randolph
of the D.C. Circuit has suggested that dissents from denial of
rehearing en banc may constitute advisory opinions, which would
exceed the scope of Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement
for justiciability.185 This argument has greater force in cases where
the poll is conducted nostra sponte,186 because a petition for
rehearing en banc is a legitimate part of the adversarial process.187
No court has yet ruled that these opinions are unconstitutional.188
Even if the opinions related to en banc denial are constitutional
and worth the expenditure of time and effort, they are a strain on
collegiality.189 The occasional publication of an opinion regarding a
failed en banc poll would not necessarily have any serious impact on
the collegiality of the court. However, the Second Circuit’s use of
these opinions has exceeded the threshold. To the extent that some of
the judges are attempting to overturn the tradition of hearing few
cases en banc, the goal is laudable. But in light of the continued
intransigence of the circuit over the years, other methods are called
for.

182

Solimine, supra note 73, at 335–36.
See Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 538 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J.,
dissenting) (“In recent years, it has become more common on our circuit to attempt
to add to, subtract from, or recharacterize the facts recited and relied upon in a
challenged panel opinion, or even to fine-tune, if not fundamentally reshape, the
legal analysis undertaken by the original panel, in the course of opinions respecting
the denial of rehearing en banc.”).
184
David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 578 (2001) (“En banc missives sometimes make a
good point, but in general they resemble political tracts.”).
185
Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (statement of Randolph, J.) (“All of this may be good for the soul. But it
rubs against the grain of Article III's ban on advisory opinions.”).
186
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
187
See Solimine, supra note 73, at 333 (noting that the opinions are “usually
the result of the adversarial process”).
188
See Sur, supra note 163, at 1330.
189
See id. at 1361–63.
183
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III. PROPOSAL
A. Adopt a Nonmajority En Banc Procedure
The current rule requiring a majority vote to initiate en banc
proceedings is too stringent. The Supreme Court requires just four
votes to grant certiorari.190 A similar policy for en banc rehearings
would allow the courts of appeals to consider cases in a precedential
setting, even when a majority of judges may have agreed with the
panel opinion. Eliminating evenly split denials of rehearing en banc
would drastically decrease the number of contentious cases
producing dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc. While an
evenly divided vote signals a close issue, a dissent that fails to garner
much support suggests to external audiences that the issue is settled
to the satisfaction of a large majority.
The rule governing the en banc procedures applies equally to all
circuits.191 However, the courts of appeals vary in size, from six to
twenty-nine.192 One potential solution is to eliminate the majority
rule and delegate en banc procedures to the individual circuits.
However, in light of the Second Circuit’s reluctance to hear cases en
banc, that is unlikely to change anything.
The Supreme Court, through the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, could set the threshold for granting en banc for each
circuit. Rather than specifying the number of votes required, the new
rule could utilize a fixed fraction, such as two-fifths (rounding
down). This would allow the rule to adapt to any changes in the size
of the circuits. A two-fifths threshold translates into the required vote
of five judges in favor of rehearing en banc in the Second Circuit.
Though the precise votes in en banc polls are not always published, a
five-vote threshold would have forced an en banc rehearing in every
case since 1999 where the Supreme Court granted certiorari.193 In
contrast, based on the published decisions, only one case where
190

This is merely a convention, not required by statute or Supreme Court
Rules. See Lyle Denniston, Yale Law School Panel Discussion: Is the “Rule of
Four” Fully Intact? (Sep. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Clinics/Lyle_Denniston.pdf.
191
FED R. APP. P. 35.
192
United States Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals Additional Authorized
Judgeships (2010) available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Judges
Judgeships/docs/authAppealsJudgeships.pdf.
193
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011) (five against
en banc, five for en banc); Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (7-6);
Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2005) (7-5); Amnesty Int’l USA v.
Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011) (6-6); In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 681
F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (8-5).
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certiorari was denied would have been reheard en banc.194 En banc
would have been granted in two further cases where certiorari was
not sought.195
The Second Circuit’s practice of delaying the decision on
whether to hear a case en banc until the Supreme Court has ruled on
the certiorari petition is not consistent with the purpose of en banc
hearings. Because the Supreme Court can grant very few petitions
for certiorari, the cases they hear nearly always involve issues of
exceptional importance or disharmony among the circuits.196
Because circuit unity and issues of exceptional importance are
precisely the Rule 35 standards for rehearing a case en banc, the
Second Circuit could have arguably heard en banc every case where
certiorari was granted.197 A certiorari petition should not toll the time
for the circuits to decide whether to rehear a case en banc.
B. Conduct En Banc on the Briefs
An en banc rehearing need not require any significant
expenditure of judicial resources beyond what is currently being
expended on opinions related to en banc rehearing. The preparation
of dissents and concurrences consumes as much time as the usual en
banc opinion-writing procedure.198 Given the tremendous sunk cost
involved in preparing these dissents and concurrences, the marginal
effort required to convert the drafts into precedential opinions could
actually be minimal. There is no requirement that the parties must rebrief and argue the issues in front of the en banc court, though the
court is free to require additional briefing and argument.199 If re194

Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769 (2d Cir. 2000) (at least five judges
voted for rehearing en banc (Kearse, Calabresi, Parker, Straub, Sotomayor, JJ.), at
least four voted against it (Walker, C.J., Jacobs, Sack, Katzmann, JJ.)).
195
Policiano v. Herbert, 453 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006) (8-5), United States v.
Lynch, 181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999) (6-6).
196
See Smith, supra note 171, at 748 (noting that when dissenting court of
appeals judges point out a circuit split, there is a statistically significant effect on
the likelihood of certiorari being granted).
197
In deciding whether to grant certiorari, the Supreme Court considers
whether a “decision [is] in conflict with the decision of another [circuit] on the
same important matter.” SUP CT. R. 10; cf. FED. R. APP. P. 35 (stating that en banc
rehearing “ordinarily will not be ordered unless en banc consideration is necessary
to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions or the proceeding involves
a question of exceptional importance”).
198
See Kozinski Statement, supra note 180, at 13 (“Frequently, other judges
circulate memoranda in support or opposition [before the en banc vote]. Many of
these memos are as complex and extensive as the opinion itself.”).
199
See Newman I, supra note 18, at 369–70 (“An in banc rehearing in the
Second Circuit does not require oral argument . . . . Customarily, parties are invited
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briefing and arguing is too cumbersome, there is no reason why the
case should not be resolved on the briefs. This is essentially the crux
of the mini en banc procedure when the majority of judges are in
agreement with the panel majority.200 Expanding the mini en banc to
allow for resolution on the merits would address the primary concern
of those who fear that any usage of the increased en banc procedure
would consume an unwarranted amount of judicial resources.
C. Vote Publishing
Because results of en banc polls are not otherwise published,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc has been considered a
safety valve, allowing judges to register their opinion on the
record.201 Judge Reinhardt believes the practice of the Ninth Circuit
prohibiting the release of the vote tallies is simply wrong.202
Publishing the votes from an en banc poll would largely serve the
same purpose as the dissent from denial of rehearing en banc.
Publicizing the fact that the circuit’s judges are closely divided on an
issue would have much the same benefits of a dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc, while avoiding the costly and fractious process of
drafting opinions related to the denial. Even though some judges may
choose to continue to author dissents from denial of rehearing en
banc, the incentive to do so would be decreased.
IV. CONCLUSION
The en banc process is a statutorily mandated procedure for
resolving issues of exceptional importance, and has fallen into disuse
by the Second Circuit. This disuse is a failure to meet the
responsibilities that Congress assigned to them. Second Circuit
judges have authored a large quantity of opinions dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc in an effort to increase the use of the en
banc rehearing. However, the Circuit has generally maintained its
aversion to en banc hearings.
On first glance, opinions regarding the denial of rehearing en
banc seem to do little harm. Yet upon closer examination, these
opinions have the potential to do serious harm to the judicial process.
to submit new briefs to the in banc court, although in banc reconsiderations
sometimes are decided on the original papers.”).
200
See supra Part II.B.
201
See Solimine, supra note 73, at 326–30.
202
Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1539–40 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“We do not reveal whether the vote
was close or even whether a majority of the eligible judges voted against en banc
review . . . . I believe the answer is that the rule is wrong under all
circumstances.”).
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Judicial resources and collegiality are difficult to quantify, but both
suffer from excessive publication of nondispositive opinions.
Because these opinions have not previously been examined as a
whole, it has been easy to minimize the extent of the harm.
This Note has attempted to raise the concerns with opinions
regarding denial of rehearing en banc and suggested several methods
to curb their propagation. Relaxing the majority requirement to
initiate en banc would both increase the number of en bancs and
reduce the number of dissents from denial of rehearing en banc.
Allowing disposition of en banc rehearings without oral argument
would allow the courts of appeals to fulfill their statutorily mandated
duty without an undue increase in workload. Publishing vote counts
without allowing nondispositive opinions regarding en banc denial
would provide some of the same signaling benefits without the
negative effects of the published dissents.
V. APPENDIX

Table 1
Second Circuit En Bancs since 1970203
Year

Case

1970
1970
1971
1971
1971
1971
1972
1972

United States ex rel Witt v. LaValleee204
Scanapico v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co.205
Williams v. Adams206
Sostre v. McGinnis207
United States v. N.Y. Times Co.208
United States v. Manning209
Drachman v. Harvey210
Rodriguez v. McGinnis211
203

Supreme
Court
disposition
Not sought
Not sought
Reversed
Cert. denied
Reversed
Cert. denied
Not sought
Reversed

Second Circuit en bancs prior to 1963 are collected in Walters v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., 312 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1963).
204
424 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
205
439 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc).
206
441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), rev’d, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
207
442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Sostre v.
Oswald, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
208
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (per curiam). This is the Pentagon Papers case.
209
448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
210
453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc).
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1974

Hilbert v. Dooling212
Lanza v. Drexel213
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States214
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp.215
United States v. Kaylor216

1977
1977
1977
1978
1978

United States v. Robin217
United States v. Robinson218
East Hartford Ed. Ass’n v. Bd. of Ed219
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.220
Turpin v. Mailet221

1979
1980

Turpin v. Mailet222
Armstrong v. McAlpin223

1980
1980
1982
1983
1984

United States v. Muse224
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent225
Daye v. Attorney Gen. of N.Y.226
New York by Abrams v. 11 Cornwell Co.227
United States v. O’Grady228

1973
1973
1973
1974

211

65

Cert. denied
Not sought
*
Cert. denied
Summarily
vacated
Not sought
Cert. denied
Not sought
Cert. denied
Summarily
vacated
Not sought
Summarily
vacated
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Not sought
Not sought
Not sought

456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc), rev’d sub nom., Preiser v. Rodriguez,
407 U.S. 919 (1973).
212
476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
213
479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
214
480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), motion for leave to file petition of
certiorari denied sub nom., Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 416 U.S. 979
(1974), and motion to file petition of mandamus and/or prohibition denied, 416
U.S. 980 (1974).
215
496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc), overruled by, Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc). But see infra note 223 (noting
that the Supreme Court subsequently vacated Armstrong).
216
491 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc), vacated sub nom. United States v.
Hopkins, 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
217
553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam).
218
560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
219
562 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1977 (en banc).
220
579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
221
579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), vacated sub nom., City of West
Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974 (1978).
222
591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam) (on remand).
223
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
224
633 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 984 (1981).
225
654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
226
696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
227
718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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1986

In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon
Doe229
United States v. Capo230
Albert v. Carovano231
United States v. Monsanto232
Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co.233
United States v. Indelicato234
Beauford v. Helmsley235

1987
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989

United States v. MacDonald236
United States v. Monsanto237
United States v. Chestman238
Asherman v. Meachum239
Bellamy v. Cogdell240
In re Extradition of McMullen241
United States v. DiNapoli242
Baker v. Pataki243
Fisher v. Vassar College244
Ayala v. Speckard245
Eastwood Auto Body & Garage, Inc. v. City
of Waterbury246

1990
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1996
1997
1997
1998

228

2013

Cert. denied
Not sought
Not sought
Reversed
Not sought
Cert. denied
Summarily
vacated
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Not sought
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Not sought
Not sought
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Not sought

742 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1984) (en banc), overruled by Evans v. United States,
504 U.S. 255 (1992).
229
781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Roe v.
United States, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986).
230
817 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1987) (en banc).
231
851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
232
852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev’d, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
233
860 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc).
234
865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
235
865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc), vacated, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
236
916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
237
924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 943 (1991).
238
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
239
957 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc).
240
974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 960 (1993).
241
989 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993).
242
8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).
243
85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (per curiam) (vacating panel decision
and affirming decision below by an equally divided court).
244
114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075
(1998), and abrogated by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
133 (2000).
245
131 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 958 (1998).
246
157 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (per curiam).
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Benjamin v. Jacobson247
Brown v. Andrews248
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp.249
United States v. Thomas250
United States v. Rybicki251
United States v. Penaranda252
Hayden v. Pataki253; Muntaqim v. Coombe254
Shi Liang Lin v. Dep’t of Justice255
United States v. Cavera256
Arar v. Ashcroft257
Portalatin v. Graham258

1999
2000
2001
2001
2003
2004
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

247

67

Cert. denied
Not sought
Not sought
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Other
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Cert. denied
Cert. denied

172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Benjamin v.
Kerik, 528 U.S. 824 (1999).
248
220 F.3d 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“At the in banc argument [New
York abandoned its position]. Because there was no dispute between the
parties . . . , the in banc court dissolved itself.”).
249
274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
250
274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
251
354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 809 (2004).
252
375 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2004) (en banc), certified questions dismissed, 543
U.S. 1117 (2005).
253
449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc).
254
449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004).
255
494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., Zhen Hua
Dong v. Dep’t of Justice, 553 U.S. 1053 (2008).
256
550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
257
585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
258
624 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1693 (2011).
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Table 2
Second Circuit Cases Producing Dissents from the Denial of
Rehearing En Banc
Year Case

Opinion
Author(s)

1958

Clark,
Waterman

1959
1960
1960
1962
1962
1963

Am.-Foreign S.S.
Corp. v. United
States 261
Matthies v.
Seymour Mfg.
Co.262
Glenmore v.
Ahern263
Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Dixon
Textiles Corp.264
Puddu v. Royal
Neth. S.S. Co.265
Nuzzo v. Rederi266
Walters v. MooreMcCormack Lines,
Inc. 267
259

Reasoning259 Subsequent
History of
panel
opinion260
E
Vacated

Clark

E

Cert. denied

Clark

I

Cert. denied

Clark

C, S, SC

Not sought

Clark

C, SC

Cert. denied

Clark
Clark

SC
C, SC

Not sought
Not sought

Abbreviations: C-overturns circuit precedent, E-erroneous conclusion, Iissue of exceptional importance, S-creates circuit split, SC-inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent.
260
Because rehearing en banc was denied, the actual writ of certiorari was
filed with respect to the undisturbed panel opinion, rather than order denying
rehearing. In the earlier cases, this order was often published together with the
panel opinion. For simplicity, the citations to the panel opinions are omitted and
the Supreme Court disposition is noted relative to the order denying rehearing en
banc. All writs of certiorari at a different procedural stage (such as when a case
returns to a three judge panel after a remand to a District Court) are omitted.
261
265 F.2d 136, 155 (2d Cir. 1958) (statement of Clark, C.J. & Waterman,
J.), vacated, 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
262
271 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960).
263
276 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom,
Tri-Continental Financial Corp, v. Glenmore, 362 U.S. 964 (1960).
264
280 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1960), overruled by Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367
F.2d 197 (2d Cir.) (en banc).
265
303 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 840 (1962).
266
304 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1962).
267
312 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1963).
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1963
1970
1971
1972
1973
1973
1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1975
1975
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Grayson-Robinson
Stores v.
S.E.C.268
Chasins v. Smith
Barney269
Scenic Hudson Pres.
Conference v. Fed.
Power Comm’n270
Zahn v. Int’l Paper
Co.271
United States v.
Puco272
Boraas v. Vill. of
Belle Terre273
Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin274
Galella v. Onassis275
Jackson v. Statler
Found.276
United States v.
Toscanino277
Boyd v. Lefrak
Org.278
Morgan v.
Montanye279
Kirkland v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Corr.
Servs.280

268

69

Clark

C, SC

Not sought

Friendly

I

Not sought

Timbers

I

Cert. denied

Timbers

I

Affirmed

Friendly

C, SC

Cert. denied

Timbers

C, I

Reversed

Oakes

I

Vacated

Timbers
Friendly

I
E, I

Not sought
Cert. denied

Mulligan

C, I, SC

Not sought

Kaufman,
Oakes
Oakes

C, I

Cert. denied

I, S, SC

Cert. denied

Mansfield,
Kaufman

C, S

Cert. denied

320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
270
453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
271
469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), aff’d, 414. U.S. 291 (1973), superseded by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
272
476 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 844 (1973).
273
476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
274
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
275
487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
276
496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
277
504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974).
278
517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
279
521 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976).
280
531 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
269
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Arthur Lipper Corp.
v. SEC281
Gilliard v.
Oswald282
United States v.
Grasso283
United States v.
Ramos284
Wilson v.
Henderson285
United States v.
Barnes286
Katherine Gibbs
Sch. v. FTC287
Pico v. Bd. of
Educ.288
United States v.
Valencia289
Langone v. Smith290
United States v.
Margiotta291
Consumers Union v.
General Signal
Corp.292
McCray v.
Abrams293
Freeman v.
Rideout294

281

2013

Oakes

I

Cert. denied

Oakes

C, SC

Not sought

Timbers

C, I, SC

Vacated

Timbers

C

Not sought

Oakes

C, I

Cert. denied

Oakes

I

Cert. denied

Oakes

I

Not sought

Mansfield

C, I, S

Affirmed

Van
C
Graafeiland
Oakes
I, S
Winter
I

Not sought

Oakes

Cert. denied

E, I

Winter,
I
Van
Graafeiland
Oakes,
C, SC
Newman

Cert. denied
Cert. denied

Summarily
vacated
Cert. denied

551 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978).
557 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1977).
283
568 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 901 (1978).
284
572 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1978).
285
590 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 945 (1979).
286
604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
287
628 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1979).
288
646 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
289
645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1980).
290
682 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983).
291
811 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
292
730 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
293
756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986).
294
826 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988).
282
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1988
1989
1989
1991

1991
1992
1999
2000
2000
2004
2004
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United States v.
Melendez-Carrion295
In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert
Inc.296
New Era Publ’ns
Int’l v. Henry Holt,
Co.297
Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna
Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee298
United States v.
Salerno299
United States v.
Concepcion300
United States v.
Lynch301
Brown v. City of
Oneonta302
Koehler v. Bank of
Berm.303
Ramos v. Town of
Vernon304
Muntaqim v.
Coombe305

295

71

Newman

C

Not sought

Newman

I

Cert. denied

Newman

I

Cert. denied

Oakes

C, E, S

Affirmed

Newman

C, S

Reversed

Newman

I

Cert. denied

Cabranes

I

Not sought

Calabresi,
Straub
Sotomayor,
Calabresi
Walker

E, I

Cert. denied

I

Certified to
NY COA
Not sought

Jacobs

I

I

Cert. denied
then
reheard
en banc

837 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1988).
869 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied.
297
884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
298
925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), aff’d, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
299
952 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1991), rev’d, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).
300
983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom., Frias v. United States,
510 U.S. 856 (1993).
301
181 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 1999).
302
235 F.3d 769 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2001).
303
229 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2000).
304
353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).
305
385 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004) & vacated
by 449 F.3d 371 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam).
296
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2005

Landell v. Sorrell306

2005

United States v.
Martin307
Policiano v.
Herbert308
Zhong v. Dep’t of
Justice309
Ricci v.
DeStefano310
United States v.
Fell311

2006
2007
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010

2011

Watson v. Geren312
United States v.
Stewart313
Rosario v. Ercole314
United States v.
Whitten315
Ark. Carpenters
Health & Welfare
Fund v. Bayer
AG316
Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum317
306

2013

Walker,
Jacobs,
Cabranes,
Raggi
Pooler

E, SC, I

Reversed

I

Cert. denied

Raggi,
Wesley
Jacobs

E

Not sought

C

Not sought

Jacobs,
Cabranes
Calabresi,
Pooler,
Sack
Raggi
Cabranes

I

Reversed

I

Cert. denied

E
C, E

Not sought
Cert. denied

Jacobs,
Pooler
Livingston

SC

Cert. denied

C, S, SC

Not sought

Pooler

E

Cert. denied

Lynch,
Katzmann

E, I, S

Cert.
granted

406 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230 (2006).
307
430 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1192 (2006).
308
453 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006).
309
489 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2007).
310
530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
311
571 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct 1880 (2010).
312
587 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2009).
313
597 F.3d 514 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom., Sattar v. United States,
130 S. Ct. 1924 (2010).
314
617 F.3d 683 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom., Rosario v. Griffin, 131
S. Ct 2901 (2011).
315
623 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2010).
316
625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom., La. Wholesale Drug
Co., Inc. v. Bayer AG, 131 S. Ct 1606 (2011).
317
642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).

LUCERO, FINAL

4/25/2013 9:06 PM

THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S EN BANC CRISIS

2013

2011

Amnesty Int’l USA
v. Clapper318

2012

Alliance for Open
Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v.
U.S. Agency for
Int’l Dev.319
In re Am. Express
Merchs.’ Litig.320

2012
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Raggi,
Livingston,
Jacobs,
Hall
Cabranes

C, E, I, S, SC Reversed

SC

Cert.
granted

Jacobs,
Cabranes,
Raggi

C, E, SC

Cert.
granted

Table 3
Published En Banc Voting Records of Current Second Circuit Judges
Judge

Dissents

Concurs

Dennis G. Jacobs
José A. Cabranes
Rosemary S.
Pooler
Robert Katzmann
Reena Raggi
Richard C.
Wesley
Peter W. Hall
Debra Ann
Livingston
Gerard E. Lynch
Denny Chin
Raymond Lohier,
Jr.

10
12
6

318

4
3
9

Opinions
Authored
10
7
9

Possible
Cases
22
22
20

1
11
7

8
2
5

6
6
3

19
17
17

2
6

3
1

1
2

16
12

2
2
0

1
1
1

2
0
0

9
7
4

321

667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
678 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013).
320
681 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom., Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
321
This figure includes cases where the judge was known to have voted
against rehearing en banc (because otherwise a majority would have voted to
rehear), but did not join a published opinion. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l (Six of the
twelve active judges dissented or joined dissents, so the remaining six judges
necessarily voted to deny rehearing en banc or abstain.). Because of the rule
regarding en banc polls, abstaining (but not a recusal) has the same effect as a
concurrence. See supra note 33.
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Droney
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